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Abstract:
Two-person zero-sum games of pursuit/evasion and target attack/defense
are considered. The geometric solution of these games, and some
variations of them, is given. Several more complex games are discussed.
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By a simple pursuit type game, we shall mean a game in which the
players move with simple motion in the plane. That is, the coordinate
velocities are given by
X = w cos <}>(t)
y = w sin <£(t)
where w is a constant, and <j>(t) is an arbitrary (integrable) function.
We note that paths with sharp corners are permitted under the assumption
of simple motion. The speed of the player is w at all times.
The object of one player, P, will be to "capture" the second, E,
by causing the distance between them to be less than P's "capture
radius," I >_ 0. The capture radius may be zero.
We want to consider this as a two player, zero sum game, so there
must be defined some quantity which one player seeks to minimize, and
the other to maximize. This quantity is called the "payoff." For
example, the payoff in the simplest pursuit game is time-to-capture,
which P wants to minimize and E wants to maximize.
We will assume that the pursuer, P, moves at least as fast as the
evader, E, since otherwise E can outrun P, and reach any point he de-
sires (if £ = 0). Consider the set of points which E can reach before
capture by P, regardless of the motion of P. This will be called the
"safe region," and its boundary will be called the "BSR". "Safe
region" may be a misnomer, since it is not a safe region in the sense
that E may not be captured in it; if he plays poorly he could be captured
in it.
For zero capture radius (£ = 0) , and P moving with speed w, E
with speed v, w > v, the BSR is a circle. It is the set of points
X = (x,y) such that vlx - xl = wlx - xl, where X = (x ,y ) and1 p ' ' e " p p J p
X = (x ,y ) are the starting points of P and E, respectively. The
equation of the circle (known as the Appolonius circle) is
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where a = v/w.
If the capture radius is i > 0, then the BSR becomes the oval
a [ I X -X I - I ] = I X -X I
.
P e
For a = 1 and £ = 0, the BSR is a straight line, the perpendicular
bisector of the line segment from P to E. If a = 1 and £ > 0, the BSR
is the branch of a hyperbola, with P and E at the foci. It is, of course,
the branch nearest to E.
2. The Simple Pursuit Game .
Let the initial positions of P and E be given as X and X . The
payoff is time to capture, with E seeking to maximize. It is clear that
E should head for the point of the BSR which is furthest from P, since
that will maximize P's travel time hence the time to capture. Thus,
E heads directly away from P along the line through their initial positions,
and P pursues along this line. If one player plays in less than optimal
fashion, the other takes maximum advantage of such a goof by continually
employing his optimal strategy, i.e., heading directly toward (or away
from) the other player. We assume, of course, that no prior knowledge
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of the non-optimal action by either is known by the other player. A
player knowing the other's optimal strategy cannot employ that to his
advantage, a characteristic of two-player, zero-sum games.
We digress a moment to consider the implications of the assumptions
of simple motion. First, the constant speed is no restriction, since
if either player uses a lower speed, he clearly "loses" compared to his
payoff by using maximum speed.
The fact that sudden changes in direction can be employed is some-
what disturbing, although we note that the optimal paths are straight
lines. Thus, except for a possible change in direction initially, this
poses no particular problem. If the initial range is large compared to
the turn radius, simple motion is a good approximation. The exception
would be if the evader is maneuverable enough to "sidestep" the pursuer.
This then becomes a very complicated problem to solve, as can be noted
by browsing through [1], and noting that a large portion is devoted to
the solution of the "homicidal chauffeur" game.
3. Variations .
3.1 Guarding a target.
In this game the payoff is the closest approach, by E, to a
target area (or point) before he is captured. We shall give the
solution geometrically and then present all the equations necessary
to direct the pursuer and evader in their optimal paths.
Again, consider the BSR. It is clear that the closest E can
come to the target is the distance from the target to the BSR. E
heads directly for the point of the BSR closest to the target. P
also heads for this point to prevent E from making a closer approach
to the target. For a = 1, and I = 0, we have the following plan,
Figure 1, for a typical game. C denotes the capture point if both
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Figure 1: Guarding a target, a = 1
We now consider the algebraic solution, as derived from the
geometric one, where the target is the origin and I = 0. Let E
and P start at (X ,Y ) , (X ,Y ), and define the following quantities,
e e p p
(p ,<J> ) - polar coordinates of E
(p ,<J> ) - polar coordinates of P,
/2, 2
p = /x +y
e e J e




p = vx +y
P P P
-1 ^
4> = tan —
^
/ 2 2
d = /(x -x ) + (y -y ) , the initial distance between
e p ' e * p
P and E.
-4-
We note that the arctangent values are not principal values, but
rather are determined by the signs of the coordinates of E and P.
For a < 1, let (h,k) be the center of the BSR (a circle).
2








a2p ~P 2 2 2 -d2
and the radius r, is given by r = ^—— + h k =
1-a 1-a
Let the polar coordinates of the center of the BSR be denoted







d> = tan t
a k
Let the "expected capture point," that is, the point of the BSR
closest to the origin, be denoted by C, with coordinates (x ,y ).
Then, the polar coordinates of C, (p ,<{> ) are simply (p - r,<j) ),
C C 3 3.















y = (p -r) sin $ = = (1 )kJ
c a a p p
a a
For a = 1 the BSR is the line
2 2VXp ye"yP p e "p r
~d x + "d y = -id-
The point of that line closest to the origin is at an angle
2 2
-1 Vye P e "p p
<b = tan —c at a distance p = —-, r . Transforming to
c x -x c 2d
P e
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Now if we let (a ,9 ) denote the range and direction from
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Figure 2: Defending a target, a=l/3
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Figure 3 shows the paths when the defender acts optimally at
all times, while the attacker simply heads directly toward the
target. The increasing penalty he pays for non-optimal action
is shown by the increasing distance of his closest possible
approach.
The points labeled 0,1,... show the closest
possible approach of E, if he reverts to
optimal action at the points labeled 0', 1',...













Figure 3: Guarding a target, a=l
3.2 Two Pursuers .
We consider the safe region for E from each of the two pursuers
Their intersection is his safe region in this game. The optimal
action for all three participants is to head for the boundary
point of the safe region which is furthest from the pursuers.






Figure 4: Two pursuers with a
1
<l,a_=l
3. 3 Maneuverable Target
We consider a variation of the problem considered in 3.1, now
allowing the target to be maneuverable. It is possible for T to
be initially in E's safe region, but move out of it before E
arrives.
It initially seems that the appropriate action for the target
is to move away from E along the line through his own position and
the point C, the capture point for the game outlined in 3.1.
However, this is not necessarily the case, since by reducing the
time to capture, E can reduce the amount by which T can increase
his distance.
It is again clear the E should head directly for some point of
the BSR, P should head for the same point, and T should move in a
straight line through his initial position and the new capture
point. This reduces the problem to a simple minimization problem;
to which point of the BSR should E head in order to minimize the
distance from himself to T, at the time he reaches the BSR? The
necessary calculations to solve this problem have not been carried
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out. They should be straightforward, if tedious, although an
analytical solution may not be possible in the general case.
3.4 Undetected Pursuer .
Suppose that E is attacking a target, and has been detected
by P, but does not know that. P is to attempt to capture E. We
assume that the probability of E having discovered he is being
pursued is given as a function of distance between E and P. We
assume that E and P act in optimal fashion in the target defense
game, as soon as E discovers P.
Now, if E never discovers P, P's optimal course is to intercept
E directly, assuming E is intent on attacking the target. If
E knows P has discovered him at the outset, the game reduces
to that of target defense.
Our assumptions have reduced this to a maximization problem;
in this case, not so simple, however. Let Q(d) be the probability
that E has discovered P by the time they are a distance d apart.
Assume P moves with velocity (w cos ^(t), w sin <J)(t)) along a
apth P(t), and that E moves along E(t) until he discovers P.
Let u(4>;t) be the distance between P and E at time t, and
let p (<f> ;t) denote the distance from the target to the capture
point if E discovers P at time t. Then the expected distance to






Assuming that Q(t) and u(<f>;t) are dif ferentiable functions of t,







The optimal path for P Is determined by a function 4>(t)
which maximizes the above integral. Clearly this is a very
difficult problem to solve.
One could also include a probability that E destroys the
target by coming within a given distance, then seek to minimize the
probability of E destroying the target.
The complexity of the problem dictates that its solution
should yield a significantly better expected value than P can
achieve by simply defending the target on the assumption that E may
revert to optimal attack at any time. One quickly convinces himself
that this is likely not the case, since if P starts near the target,
compared to E, the headings which P could take do not vary
significantly. That is, the angle between the straight intercept
path, assuming E heads directly to T, and the optimal target defense
path is quite small.
4. A modified pursuit game .
Let us modify the pursuit game in the following way. We assume that
P must pay a penalty to determine the position of E. That is, he must
stop, wait At seconds before determining E's position, and then wait
At- seconds before starting out again. At other times we assume P moves
with simple motion, as does E.
It is assumed that E knows all the rules of the game pertaining to
P. We start the game at an instant where P has determined E's position.
Payoff is time to capture.
We assume P and E move at speeds w and v, and that P has a capture
radius £ > 0. We later give a lower bound for £ which ensures the
capture of E by P.
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We note that if P has determined E's position and traveled in a
straight line for t seconds, P moves a distance wt while E can move
a distance V (t+At~). If P locates E, travels for t seconds and locates
E again, P has traveled a distance wt, while E has traveled a distance
v(t + At + At ).
We will give a strategy for P. It is apparently not optimal,
although it does enjoy a property of two-person zero-sum games: It can
be announced in advance by P with penalizing himself. E's strategy is
a choice of directions to move between times that P locates E's position.
Let L denote the last known position of E. Then our strategy is
for P to proceed to L, take a new reading on E's position, and repeat.
Now, it is possible for P to stop at a point near L, and be sure he has
not increased the capture time. In fact he may decrease it if E moves
other than directly away from P. E's optimal strategy cannot be to move
directly away from P, since knowledge of that would allow P to capture
with no stops, if E employed the strategy, thus decreasing the time
to capture. It is expected that the optimal strategy for P involves,
for each move, a probability distribution of stopping points.
Likewise, the optimal strategy for E likely involves a probability dis-
tribution of directions to proceed between P's data points. When the number
of times P must stop is large (4 or 5 or more, perhaps), it is anticipated
that the expected capture time for the optimal strategy would not
be significantly better than the time for the strategy we outline
below.
We give the details of our strategy for P, and show it cannot be
improved on by any strategy which requires the same number of stops.
For a smaller number of stops it is possible for E to escape.
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Suppose the initial distance between P and E is p.. P travels to
P
L, taking a time to travel of — , and determines E's position. Then
P
v
E's distance is p n = v(— + At, + At_). Letting a = — and T =1 w 12 w
At, + At
2
, we obtain p = ap Q + vT, p = ap + vT
= a(ap + vT) + vT =
a p.. + (a+l)vT. In general, p = a p rt + (a +a +...+l)vT = a p n +U n U
vT. We see that lim p = . Since E travels a distance
1-a n -
n-*» 1-a
VAt after P stops, and before E's position is determined, it is
necessary that the capture radius, £, satisfy the inequality
1 > & " vAt l " I^1At l + "2 " (1-° )At l ]
" l^[At 2 + aAt l ]
i^rtwAt2 + vAt i 1 -
Then, if i > = (wAt„ + vAt n ), we can determine the number of stops1-a 2 1
required before capture. We achieve capture after n moves where n is
the smallest integer which satisfies the inequality
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Now, the time to capture, T
,
satisfies the equation
[T - (n T + At„)]w = vT + p - I provided n^ stops are required, andcoz cl)
that E acts in an optimal way. Solving for T
, we find




c w - V
It is clear that if n~ stops are required to achieve capture, there
is no strategy for P which will assure him of capture in less time. This
is seen by induction on the number of stops required, and noting that
the time to capture cannot be decreased in any one step by more than
the amount spent in taking that step, assuming E makes his best possible




A more appropriate way for the pursuer to behave would require
somewhat more information as to the where-abouts of E. Any change in
the payoff which would require this additional stopping by P seems artificial
Thus it seems one could just as well impose an artificial constraint on
P's motion. For example, we might want to make sure that P didn't get
closer to E than a certain distance without knowing it. P's optimal
strategy would probably again be dependent on a certain probability
distribution of stopping points, but a pure strategy such as that given
above could be given, and the time to capture bounded. This would again
require the capture radius to satisfy a certain inequality, a somewhat
larger capture radius being required than previously.
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